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Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages  
Colin Koopman, University of Oregon 
 
ABSTRACT: A growing body of interpretive literature concerning the work of 
Michel Foucault asserts that Foucault’s critical project is best interpreted in light of 
various strands of philosophical phenomenology.  In this article I dispute this 
interpretation on both textual and philosophical grounds.  It is shown that a core 
theme of ‘the phenomenological Foucault’ having to do with transcendental inquiry 
cannot be sustained by a careful reading of Foucault’s texts nor by a careful 
interpretation of Foucault’s philosophical commitments.  It is then shown that this 
debate in Foucault scholarship has wider ramifications for understanding ‘the 
critical Foucault’ and the relationship of Foucault’s projects to Kantian critical 
philosophy.  It is argued that Foucault’s work is Kantian at its core insofar as it 
institutes a critical inquiry into conditions of possibility.  But whereas critique for 
Kant was transcendental in orientation, in Foucault critique becomes historical, and 
is much the better for it. 
 
Keywords: Michel Foucault, Critique, Immanuel Kant, Phenomenology, Transcen-
dental Critique. 
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‚You seem to me Kantian or Husserlian.  In all of my work I strive instead to avoid any reference 
to this transcendental as a condition of the possibility for any knowledge.  When I say that I strive 
to avoid it, I don’t mean that I am sure of succeeding<  I try to historicize to the utmost to leave 
as little space as possible to the transcendental.  I cannot exclude the possibility that one day I 
will have to confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental.‛1 
  
The philosophical project of critique inaugurated by Immanuel Kant has led to many 
important developments over the winding pathways of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century philosophy.  One of these pathways has unfortunately overshadowed many 
of the others.  Kant envisioned his critical project, in his seemingly most famous 
moments, as a transcendental inquiry.  This transcendental inflection of the critical 
project was then taken up in his wake by a number of different philosophical 
traditions, including its notable appropriation and extension in the work of philo-
sophical phenomenology as inaugurated by Edmund Husserl in the late nineteenth 
century and then radicalized by Martin Heidegger in the twentieth.  One central 
issue for the phenomenological pathway in critical philosophy has been the attempt 
to integrate a transcendental inquiry into universal and necessary conditions of 
possibility with historical forms of inquiry that acknowledge the situated contexts 
within which all human thought apparently unfolds.  Unfortunately this pheno-
menological pathway has obscured other possible directions of furtherance for the 
Kantian project of critique.  But there are others who have attempted to develop the 
Kantian project of critique along different lines.  These other philosophers do not 
preserve the vexing idea of critique as a transcendental form of inquiry.  Among 
these I count Michel Foucault, who is as able a practitioner of Kantian critique as one 
should hope for, but who was not therefore a philosopher engaged in transcendental 
inquiry. 
 
Foucault scholarship on the whole has, however, tended to miss this point.  Many 
early interpreters of Foucault expressed relief that his work was finally directing 
philosophy away from Kantian transcendental philosophy.  These interpreters were 
right to be relieved at the exhaustion of the transcendental problematic, but perhaps 
hasty in their broad dismissal of Kant.  A more recent trend in Foucault scholarship 
that deserves our attention today involves reclaiming Foucault as part of the Kantian 
tradition, but precisely by interpreting his thought through the lens of transcen-
dental phenomenology.  This latter set of interpretations sometimes takes the strong 
                                                 
1
 Foucault to Giulio Preti in ‚A Historian of Culture,‛ debate with Giulio Preti in Michel 
Foucault, Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984. Edited by Sylvère Lotringer (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1972, 1996).  References throughout contain, in many instances, two dates: in such 
cases the first date refers to the original year of publication in the original language and the 
second date refers to the year of publication of the translation and edition to which the page 
number citation refers. 
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form of an insistence that Foucault is himself something of a phenomenologist and 
at other times takes the weaker form of the claim that Foucault’s thought must be 
read through its complex engagements with the phenomenological category of 
historical-transcendental critique even if these engagements resulted in Foucault’s 
eventual departure from phenomenology.  Both sets of interpretations, however, fail 
to detach the idea of Kantian critique from the idea of transcendental critique.  Both 
sets of interpretations insist that Foucault was or was not undertaking Kantian 
transcendental critique.  But both thereby fail to ask if perhaps Foucault was under-
taking Kantian critique without implicating himself in transcendental critique. 
 
In what follows I contest the weight of both sets of scholarly contributions by 
suggesting a quite different way of interpreting Foucault’s historical analytics of 
genealogy and archaeology.  I argue on textual grounds that Foucault rigorously 
avoided the transcendental as that which specifies the conditions of the possibility of 
our practices.  I also argue that on philosophical grounds that this was a good move 
on Foucault’s part for it enabled him to avoid certain conceptual difficulties 
implicated by any attempt at a transcendental historiography.  For these reasons, I 
conclude, it is misleading to interpret Foucault through the lens of philosophical 
phenomenology, or at least any version of phenomenology associated with trans-
cendental inquiry.  But my point here is not merely a negative one.  I also seek to 
establish the positive point that Foucault elaborated a viable alternative to pheno-
menological transcendental critique in appropriating the Kantian project of critique 
for quite different purposes.  Recent commentators emphasizing Foucault’s relation 
to phenomenology have been right to emphasize Foucault’s relation to Kant.  But in 
taking up Foucault’s Kantianism through the lens of phenomenology, they have 
misleadingly reinterpreted archaeology and genealogy as transcendental forms of 
critique.  Foucault’s relation to Kant is much more direct and as a result constitutes a 
much more radical challenge to prevailing modes of philosophical, historical, and 
critical inquiry.  For these reasons it deserves continued attention today, especially 
for those pursuing projects which aim to be simultaneously historical and critical. 
 
Historical-Transcendental Critique in Phenomenology (and Foucault) 
I shall assume some familiarity with the standard reception of Foucault (at least in 
North America) as both non-transcendental and non-critical philosopher.  Against 
the background of this standard account of Foucault’s reception, I want to draw 
attention to a rather recent trend of reinterpreting Foucault in light of some of the 
core themes informing transcendental phenomenology.  Perhaps the most important 
of these phenomenological themes that commentators have sought to turn our 
attention to concerns the uniquely phenomenological inflection of the transcendental 
inquiry supposedly at the heart of Kant’s critical project.  The story can be told as 
follows.  The phenomenologists reworked Kant’s conception of the transcendental 
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such that historicity and transcendentality can be seen to be compatible with one 
another.  Phenomenology thus opened up the possibility of what might be called 
historical transcendentality.  (If the story so far is rather familiar then it is the follo-
wing recent update to the tale that is provocative.)  Foucault then aligned himself 
with the phenomenological tradition and sought to further that method of historical-
transcendental inquiry. 
 
Probably the most influential version of this Foucault-as-phenomenologist account is 
that developed by Béatrice Han (now Han-Pile) in her 1998 book Ontologie manquée 
de Michel Foucault, which was translated into English in 2002 as Foucault’s Critical 
Project with the telling English subtitle Between the Transcendental and the Historical.2  
Han-Pile does not claim that Foucault was a transcendental-historical phenomeno-
logist so much as she argues that Foucault was something of a failed, or as her 
French title has it a ‛missed,‛ transcendental phenomenologist.  On Han-Pile’s view, 
Foucault’s project remains at core an attempt to historicize the transcendental such 
that his thought is situated at ‚the tension between the historical and the a priori.‛3  
According to this interpretation, Foucault failed in this project and ultimately 
reverted to a practice of history that in spite of his own better intentions eventually 
reduced down to little more than ‚the study of prisons on a purely empirical base.‛4  
As Gary Gutting summarizes Han-Pile in his fairly sharp but surely fair review, her 
claim is that ‚all of Foucault’s work can be read as the (failed) effort to revive the 
project of transcendental philosophy: to find the conditions of possibility for 
experience.‛5  In response to Gutting, Han-Pile reiterates her reading of Foucault’s 
archaeologies as ‚attempts to reinterpret the Kantian critical project by providing 
what might be called a ‛transcendental history‛ of the conditions of possibility of 
knowledge in the West.‛6  The view is that Foucault’s project is a failed attempt to 
locate the historical-transcendental of the Western present, and as such it is a fortiori 
precisely such an attempt.  Indeed in her recent writings Han-Pile makes little noise 
about the failures of this project and instead devotes herself almost exclusively to 
emphasizing an interpretation of Foucault as undertaking such a project.  (Perhaps 
she believes, following Hubert Dreyfus and others, that there remain other ways of 
more successfully carrying out this project.) 
 
                                                 
2 Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, translated by 
Edward Pile (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 2002). 
3 Han, 196. 
4 Ibid., 69. 
5 Gary Gutting, ‚Foucault's Critical Project,‛ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May, 2003). 
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1262>. 
6 Béatrice Han-Pile, ‚Is early Foucault a historian? History, history and the analytic of finitude,‛ 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 31, nos. 5-6 (2005):  586. 
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Kevin Thompson has very recently offered a compelling reinterpretation of Foucault 
as a historical-transcendental phenomenologist that departs in important ways from 
Han-Pile’s efforts.  Thompson begins with a helpful summary of Han-Pile:  
 
Foucault’s aspirations for a truly transcendental foundation for his research, a 
project that would set out and maintain the integrity of the transcendental field, 
are ultimately left unfulfilled.  The ontology required for a truly coherent 
account of the transcendental is missing, Han argues, and in its stead all that is 
left is an unacknowledged empiricism.7 
 
Where Han-Pile sees a failed attempt at transcendental phenomenology in Foucault, 
Thompson discerns a rather more successful attempt at the same: ‚This, we can say, 
is the core concern of Foucault’s critical history of thought.  It seeks nothing less than 
to grasp the simultaneity of historicity and transcendentality.‛8  And, pace Han-Pile, 
it does this successfully.  Thompson locates this core concern of Foucault’s through 
examinations of both his intellectual heritage and his thought.  In terms of inheri-
tance, Thompson’s argument is that Foucault is properly interpreted through a 
phenomenological lineage that reaches back through Jean Cavaillès to Edmund 
Husserl.  At the core of that lineage is precisely that viable conception of historical-
transcendental critique that Han-Pile failed to locate in Foucault.  Thompson cites 
Husserl’s influence on Cavaillès and Foucault’s claims regarding the importance of 
Cavaillès for his own archaeological and genealogical projects.  We might rejoin at 
this point with the quip that influence is not necessarily complete and transitive: 
what Cavaillès took from Husserl may not have carried over into what Foucault 
took from Cavaillès.  Fortunately, Thompson also offers an impressive rereading of 
portions of the The Archaeology of Knowledge that suggest the plausibility of an 
interpretation of the archaeological method in terms of historical-transcendental 
phenomenology.  In the final pages of that book, Thompson shows, Foucault makes 
it obvious that he is aware of his proximity to this Husserlian-Heideggerean 
problematic.  But this recognition, I shall suggest below, is far more ambivalent than 
Thompson’s interpretation suggests. 
 
Despite the obvious differences separating Thompson’s and Han-Pile’s interpre-
tations of Foucault, there is a clear commonality that enables both to pose the same 
sets of questions to Foucault, even if they arrive at different answers to these 
questions.  Both frame their interpretations of Foucault in terms of the problem of 
the relation between the transcendental and the empirical bequeathed to modern 
philosophy by Kant and taken up in his train by Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger.  
                                                 
7 Kevin Thompson, ‚Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the Pheno-
menology of the Concept,‛ History and Theory, 47 (Feb., 2008): 4. 
8 Ibid., 2. 
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Han-Pile concludes that Foucault never solved the basic Kantian problem and 
unfortunately tended to retreat to versions of historical inquiry of a more purely 
empirical variety.  Thompson concludes that Foucault took up the category of the 
transcendental-historical developed by Husserl and Cavaillès and in doing so was 
able to preserve a crucial transcendental thread within his archaeology (and possibly 
also his genealogy). 
 
This general strategy of a reinterpretation of Foucault through the lens of pheno-
menological concepts like historico-transcendentality is gaining increasing attention 
amongst Foucault scholars today.9  I find this interpretation both unsatisfying on tex-
tual grounds and unfortunate on philosophical grounds.  More crucial are these 
latter philosophical reasons.  For the interpretative strategy at issue helps to obscure 
one of Foucault’s most crucial philosophical contributions: the development of a 
modality of inquiry that both preserves a link to the Kantian project of critique as 
inquiry into conditions of possibility and does not for that reason chain itself to a 
transcendental inflection of the critical project.  To put the matter more simply, 
                                                 
9 Other recent contributions to this interpretation include that of Johanna Oksala, Foucault on 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), who argues that archaeology is ‚a 
historical description of the varying conditions of possibility of knowledge in different 
periods‛(21) and that genealogy ‚shares with phenomenology the transcendental mode of 
questioning as opposed to a purely empirical study of the subject, but it does not share the 
methodological starting point in the subject.‛(104)  See also work by Rudi Visker, Genealogy as 
Critique, translated by Chris Turner (NY: Verso, 1995) and Rudi Visker, Truth and Singularity: 
Taking Foucault into Phenomenology (Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer, 1999), Todd May, ‚Foucault’s 
Relation to Phenomenology,‛ in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault.  Second 
edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Timothy Rayner, Foucault's Heidegger: 
Philosophy and Transformative Experience (NY: Continuum, 2007), and many papers collected in the 
Foucault-Heidegger volume by Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, (eds.), Foucault and 
Heidegger: Critical Encounters (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). See also 
Andrew Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and the Problem of Resistance 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994), and Marc Djaballah, Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience (NY: 
Routledge, 2008), who read Foucault as practicing Kantian transcendental critique but directly 
through Kant rather than by way of phenomenology.  Among earlier iterations of this inter-
pretation are Hubert Dreyfus, ‚On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and 
Foucault,‛ in Timothy J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault philosopher (Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989, 1992), an attempt to read Foucault alongside Heidegger, and Gerard Lebrun, 
‚Notes on Phenomenology in Les Mots et les Choses,‛ in Timothy J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel 
Foucault Philosopher, (Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, 1992), an attempt to situate 
Foucault in a general Husserlian problematic.  As a matter of scholarly compunction it should be 
noted that Paul Rabinow, (‚Modern and Countermodern: Ethos and Epoch in Heidegger and 
Foucault,‛ in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault), does not share Dreyfus’s phenomenological 
interpretation of Foucault despite frequent mistaken references in the literature to Dreyfus and 
Rabinow as offering a reading of Foucault as a kind of hermeneutic phenomenologist. 
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Foucault is a Kantian but not a transcendental idealist in that Foucault took from 
Kant the project of critique but not the project of transcendental critique. 
 
In what follows I shall both seed doubts about the phenomenological interpretations 
of archaeology and genealogy and also sketch the outlines of an alternative 
interpretation according to which archaeology and genealogy are neither empirical 
nor transcendental.  I will argue for a view according to which Foucault fashioned a 
mode of inquiry that was, as he himself titled it, a ‚Critical History of Thought‛ that 
aimed to explicate the problematizations conditioning our historical present.10 
 
Textual Problems for the Foucault-through-Phenomenology Interpretation 
I begin by posing a small number of textual problems for the interpretive strategy 
under consideration.  These problems do not definitively refute that strategy but 
they do help seed some serious doubts about its plausibility.  My claim in this 
section is that Han-Pile’s and Thompson’s arguments must answer at least two 
difficult interpretive questions that Foucault’s work poses to any attempt to situate 
that work within a phenomenological problematic of the relation between the 
transcendental and the empirical. 
 
The first difficulty concerns Foucault’s own attempts to situate himself in a 
philosophical lineage whose relation to phenomenology is ambiguous: namely the 
lineage of Bachelard, Cavaillès, and Canguilhem.  Thompson reads this lineage, 
especially in the figure of Cavaillès, as preoccupied with phenomenological ques-
tions inherited from Husserl.  But when Foucault situated his own thought in this 
lineage he seems to have done so precisely so as to contest that phenomenological 
lineage that ran forward from Husserl to Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.  In a 
piece originally written as an introduction for the 1978 English translation of 
Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological Foucault described ‚a dividing line‛ 
running through twentieth-century French thought that ‚separates a philosophy of 
experience, of meaning, of the subject, and a philosophy of knowledge, of 
rationality, and of the concept.‛  He refers to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on one side 
as phenomenologists of experience and meaning, while he takes Cavaillès, Koyré, 
Bachelard and Canguilhem on the other side as philosophers ‚of knowledge, of 
rationality, and of the concept.‛11  In his introduction to a later English-language 
collection of Canguilhem’s essays, Paul Rabinow points out that there is a certain 
                                                 
10 Michel Foucault, ‚Foucault (by Maurice Florence),‛ a pseudonymous autobiography, in Gary 
Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. First Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984, 1994), 459. 
11 Michel Foucault, ‚Life: Experience and Science,‛ in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology: The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 2, edited by Paul Rabinow and 
James Faubion (NY: New Press, 1985, 1998), 466. 
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‚insider’s humor‛ involved in this claim: Foucault was in fact aping Canguilhem 
himself who had much earlier offered a politicized version of this very distinction.12  
The crucial point of the distinction, as it appears in Foucault and Canguilhem, is to 
locate a philosophical project that does not situate itself as an inquiry into 
transcendentalized conceptions of subjectivity or experience as conditions of 
thought, life, action.  Foucault’s quip is that despite all of those promising contor-
tions that enabled phenomenology to admit bodies, sexuality, and death into its 
analysis, ‚the cogito remained central to it.‛13 
 
Now both sides of this divide, according to Foucault, articulated their projects as a 
radicalization of Husserl.  Thompson ably shows how Husserlian historical-
transcendental phenomenology informed aspects of Cavaillès’s thought.  Despite the 
presence of the historical-transcendental in Cavaillès, it is likely that Foucault’s 
invocations of the philosophers of the concept was precisely designed as an attempt 
to contest the problematics of transcendental phenomenology in favor of the quite 
different problematics of historical epistemology.  To the transcendental treatment of 
meaning and experience, Foucault and Canguilhem opposed the historical treatment 
of rationality and concepts.  Canguilhem, for his part, wrote, some years after Fou-
cault’s death, that ‚Foucault disparaged questions with transcendental implications, 
preferring those with historical implications.‛14  Canguilhem himself also shied 
away from the transcendental strains of phenomenology.  To the extent that Fou-
cault saw his own work in this lineage, then, it may have been on the basis of its 
explicit refusal of the transcendental. 
 
In his 1978 lecture ‚What is Critique?‛ Foucault referred again to the Bachelard-
Cavaillès-Canguilhem succession, describing it as a ‚phenomenology‛ to be sure 
and yet one that ‚belongs to another history altogether.‛  The contrast is again to the 
transcendental phenomenology that dominated the intellectual context in which 
occurred his own philosophical maturation.  Foucault’s point in invoking Cavaillès 
and Canguilhem here was to show how work in the history of science can help us 
return to this question: ‚How is it that rationalization leads to the furor of power?‛15  
No matter how one reads the works of the phenomenologists of the concept, 
Foucault locates in this tradition a set of concerns which really have very little to do 
with the problematics of the transcendental in Husserlian phenomenology.  This 
                                                 
12 Paul Rabinow, ‚Introduction: A Vital Rationalist,” in Georges Canguilhem, A Vital Rationalist, 
edited by François Delaporte, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (NY: Zone Books, 1994), 21. 
13 Foucault, ‚Life: Experience and Science,‛ 477. 
14 Georges Canguilhem, ‚Introduction,‛ in Timothy J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault philosopher 
(Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, 1992), xvi. 
15Michel Foucault ‚What is Critique?‛ in The Politics of Truth, edited by Sylvère Lotringer (Los 
Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 1978, 2007), 54. 
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tradition may, however, have something to do with other questions provoked but 
unanswered by Husserl, such as those concerning the historicity of our sciences. 
 
This brings me to a second, and I think more troubling, interpretive difficulty for 
Thompson’s and Han-Pile’s arguments.  This difficulty is rooted in well-known 
claims by Foucault about phenomenology and transcendentality in The Order of 
Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge.  In the section on the problematic of the 
transcendental and the empirical in The Order of Things, Foucault clearly situates the 
‚phenomenology‛ of ‚actual experience‛ within this failing problematic and thereby 
urges that we now need to address ourselves to a somewhat different philosophical 
challenge.  That something different requires taking up the question of the 
‚existence‛ of ‚man‛ such that Foucault’s infamous musings at the end of the book 
about faces being erased at edges of seas should be seen as decidedly operating 
against a transcendental phenomenology.16 
 
Similarly, at the end of The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault disparages pheno-
menology under the heading of ‚transcendental narcissism.‛  The book closes with 
strong cautions against the transcendental:  
 
My aim was to cleanse it [this history] of all transcendental narcissism; it had to 
be freed from that circle of the lost origin, and rediscovered where it was 
imprisoned; it had to be shown that the history of thought could not have this 
role of revealing the transcendental moment that rational mechanisms has not 
possessed since Kant, mathematical idealities since Husserl, and the meanings of 
the perceived world since Merleau-Ponty – despite the efforts that had been 
made to find it here.17   
 
Foucault continues for another few pages to disparage ‚that transcendental reflexion 
with which philosophy since Kant has identified itself‛ and which unfortunately 
‚allows us to avoid an analysis of practice.‛18  He then proceeds to identify his own 
inquiry with an analysis of ‚the set of conditions in accordance with which practice 
is exercised‛ by which he means immanent conditions and not transcendental 
conditions possessing universal scope and necessary modality.19  If readers have 
detected only an implicit devotion to historical-transcendental practice in this book, 
then it is tough to know what to do when faced at the book’s end with all these 
explicit rejections of those very ideas which some have tried to impute as implicit 
procedures.  ‚It seemed to me that, for the moment, the essential task was to free the 
                                                 
16 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (NY: Vintage, 1966, 1973), 321-322. 
17 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (NY: Panthe-
on, 1969, 1972), 203.  
18 Ibid., 204 
19 Ibid., 208. 
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history of thought from its subjection to transcendence,‛ Foucault there wrote.20  
This all seems rather unequivocal.  Foucault is not merely objecting to a ‚transcen-
dental narcissism‛ that he hopes to purify for the sake of ‚transcendental inquiry 
proper,‛ but he is rather objecting to the narcissism of the transcendental project 
itself. 
 
Philosophical Problems in the Foucault-through-Phenomenology Interpretation 
Thompson and Han-Pile might respond at this point that in calling Foucault a 
transcendental thinker they are not in fact imputing to him a form of inquiry whose 
yield would be conditions of possibility that are universal (in scope) and necessary 
(in modality) as these have been traditionally understood on the basis of Kantian 
philosophy.  Rather, it might be replied, they only intend to impute to him a form of 
inquiry whose yield would be conditions of possibility that constrain thought and 
action in a somewhat different sense.  These conditions of possibility are not, as they 
are for Kant, universal and necessary in the sense of ranging across every possible 
domain of rational human thought and moral human action.  They are universal and 
necessary in a more limited sense by constraining thought and action only across a 
range of certain specifiable domains (i.e., a certain period in our intellectual history).  
Universal and necessary conditions of possibility are thereby relativized to 
determinable historical epochs or epistemes.  Thus, Foucault’s project is an analysis 
of a carefully qualified historical a priori.  It is perhaps for these reasons that 
Thompson, but not Han-Pile, interprets Foucault as a phenomenologist of the 
concept but not as a phenomenologist of experience. 
 
While the defense suggested may appear to rescue the historical-transcendental 
reading of Foucault from some of the interpretive difficulties raised above, it 
nevertheless raises some important philosophical difficulties that I now turn to.  For 
on any interpretation of Foucaultian archaeology as historical-transcendental, there 
remain distinctive philosophical shortcomings in this method of inquiry.  The crucial 
point is that these are the very shortcomings that Foucault himself sought a 
corrective to in directing his future work under the guidance of a genealogical 
method.  To the extent that we can detect hints of a transcendental analytic in 
Foucault’s archaeology, this turns out to be the very form of inquiry that generated 
many of the blockages in his work which Foucault sought to overcome in revising 
his historical-philosophical analytic.  This suggests that we might refrain from regar-
ding the methods and concepts that produced these difficulties as the abiding 
philosophical core at the heart of Foucault’s thought.  Foucault’s own self-revision 
show that his most stable concerns seemed to have been elsewhere than in his early 
engagements with transcendentality influenced by his training in phenomenology.  
Genealogy would enable Foucault to overcome the shortcomings in archaeology.  
                                                 
20 Ibid., 203. 
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But it would enable this not by forcing him to abdicate archaeology altogether, as 
Han-Pile and others have argued.21  Genealogy is best construed not as post-archaeo-
logy but as archaeology-plus.22 
 
To gain an appreciation of the philosophical problems at issue, it helps to situate 
Foucault’s thought within the wider conceptual arc where it always traveled.  This 
requires explication of a core notion that always informed Foucault’s historiography 
and philosophy.  That core notion is not transcendentality but rather problematiza-
tion.  If we are looking for a stable conceptual matrix that informs the full breadth of 
Foucault’s thought here is where we should start: ‚The notion common to all the 
work that I have done since History of Madness is that of problematization.‛23  
Problematization, not transcendentality, is the core notion in Foucault’s critical 
philosophy of history.24   
 
What is problematization?  Allow me to offer an all-too-brief explication of this idea.  
Critique as problematization can be specified as a form of inquiry with two core 
aspects: contingency and complexity.  By focusing on the emergence of hybrid net-
works of problems we can come to recognize our problems as contingent complexes 
rather than necessary givens.  By clarifying and intensifying the conditions struc-
turing these hybrid networks of problems and solutions, archaeology and genealogy 
enable us to adopt a more reflective relation to the situations in which we already 
find ourselves, whether or consciously or not, enmeshed.  Problematization in Fou-
cault’s work thus refers simultaneously to nominal objects of inquiry and verbal 
activity of inquiry.  A problematization as a nominal object is a constitutive set of 
conditions that enable and motivate practices in the present.  A problematization as 
a verbal activity is a form of inquiry that articulates and intensifies such nominal 
problematizations. 
 
                                                 
21 Han-Pile ‚Is early Foucault a Historian?‛ 73 ff.. 
22 I develop this reading of the relationship between archaeology and genealogy at much greater 
length in Colin Koopman, ‚Foucault's Historiographical Expansion: Adding Genealogy to 
Archaeology,‛ Journal of the Philosophy of History 2, no. 3 (2008): 338-362. Since the publication of 
that article my view of these matters has been greatly improved through conversations with 
Arnold Davidson.  
23 Michel Foucault ‚The Concern for Truth,‛ an interview by François Ewald, in Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984, edited by Lawrence Kritzman (NY: 
Routledge, 1984, 1988), 257. 
24This is the central argument of my forthcoming book Genealogy as Problematization, where the 
concept of problematization is expounded at much greater length. 
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Problematization, as Foucault conceived it, draws simultaneously on both archaeo-
logy and genealogy.25  Archaeology describes the static forms of problematizations, 
whereas genealogy engages the contingent historical emergence of these problema-
tizations in the context of complex practices.  Archaeology lays bare a field of prac-
tices whilst genealogy tracks the flow of these fields into the present practices that 
are their target.  Archaeology analyzes logics of rules and genealogy analyzes 
dynamics of strategies.  These two modes of inquiry fit together quite nicely.  Many 
of Foucault’s own studies embody this nice fit. 
 
An interpretation of Foucault through the concept of problematization yields a 
different reading of the place in his thought held by his high-period archaeological 
works of the mid-sixties.  This is relevant to the present discussion because this is the 
primary work to which any reading of Foucault through the lens of phenomenology 
must appeal.  According to my preferred interpretation, the high-period archaeo-
logical work is in certain respects tangential to the wider arc of Foucault’s attempts 
at an inquiry into the problematizations constitutive of our modernity.26  That wider 
arc of inquiry begins in History of Madness and continues through The History of 
Sexuality.  The high-period archaeological inquiry in The Order of Things is by no 
means irrelevant to this wider arc but it is nonetheless somewhat tangential in that it 
treats only of modern knowledge, while all of Foucault’s other inquiries sought to 
understand modernity at the intersection of knowledge, power, ethics, and other 
domains of practice.  Another way of putting this point is as follows: archaeology is 
not irrelevant to problematization but by itself it does not constitute a history of 
problematization, which form of history is inchoate in History of Madness, almost 
altogether missing in The Order of Things, and fully explicit by the end of The History 
of Sexuality project. 
 
This interpretive reperiodization of Foucault’s works help us make sense of the fact 
that Foucault in his later years would come to explicitly acknowledged the deficits of 
the philosophy of history offered in his high-archaeological period.  He would at one 
point even offer the following confession about this period of his work: ‚The Order of 
Things is not a book that’s truly mine; it’s a marginal book in terms of the sort of 
passion that runs through the others.‛27  I want to emphasize once again that this 
                                                 
25 Cf. Michel Foucault, ‚What is Enlightenment?‛ in Michel Foucault, Essential Writings of Michel 
Foucault, Volume One: Ethics, edited by Paul Rabinow (NY: New Press, 1984), 12. 
26 For a somewhat similar periodization see Arnold Davidson, The Emergence of Sexuality: 
Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 205. 
27 Michel Foucault, ‚Interview with Michel Foucault,‛ by Duccio Trombadori, in Power: The 
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Volume 3, edited by Paul Rabinow and James Faubion, 
(NY: State University of New York Press, 1980, 2000), 267. 
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seeming disavowal need not be read as indicating a rupture in Foucault’s thought 
such that his later genealogical works altogether abandon his earlier archaeological 
analytic.  The point need not be that archaeology was somehow overcome by gene-
alogy, but can rather be stated in terms of archaeology having been incomplete for 
Foucault’s purposes of a critique of modernity while the combined analytic 
involving both archaeology and genealogy proved more suitable for these purposes. 
 
We should regard genealogy as an expansion rather than an abdication of archaeology.  
Foucault’s genealogical works are not investigations of the conditions of the 
possibility of the rules structuring given forms of knowledge alone, as is offered by 
archaeology, but are rather investigations of the conditions of the possibility of a 
complex intersection of multiple such rules interacting along multiple vectors 
including knowledge, power, and ethics.  The archaeological analytic thus forms one 
strand or element that feeds into a broader genealogical analytic.  This does not 
imply that archaeology is reducible to genealogy insofar as the single archaeological 
strand can always be detached from the wider genealogical environment in a way 
that yields a different modality of inquiry.  The difference is one of complexity such 
that genealogy constitutes an expansion of archaeology even if the archaeological 
neutralization of just one element can indeed remain useful for certain purposes.  An 
archaeology excavates or neutralizes constraints as they are composed along a single 
vector or pathway of practice (i.e., knowledge, or power, or ethics), whilst a 
genealogy traces these constraints as they are contingently formed at the complex 
intersection of multiple vectors or pathways of practice (i.e., knowledge, and power, 
and ethics). 
 
In order to accomplish the critical purposes which he had first adopted in History of 
Madness and which persisted in his work through The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
would require the expanded historiographical analytic.  What he required, in other 
words, was a shift from his erstwhile single-vector analysis of archaeology perfected 
in The Order of Things to the wider multi-vector analysis of genealogy initiated in 
Discipline and Punish and yet only inchoate in History of Madness.  Picture an image of 
the evolution of Foucault’s thought not as a line with a distinctive break but rather 
as an hourglass—at the bottom is a complex analysis of multiple kinds of constraints 
on the emergence of practices but in a rather inchoate fashion, in the middle is 
realized a procedure for isolating just one of these kinds of constraint, and at the top 
is evidenced an analytic in which multiple kinds of constraint are treated in their 
interaction precisely because it is possible to neutralize them by invoking the 
procedure made available by the middle of the hourglass but not yet present in the 
bottom half.  The image may be somewhat unwieldy, but at least it has the virtue of 
not being misleading, as most representations of the relation between archaeology 
and genealogy unfortunately are. 
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The upshot of the preceding few pages is that an expanded genealogical analytic 
would enable Foucault to comprehend the contingent and complex intersections of 
multiple vectors of practice.  These intersections form what Foucault eventually 
came to call in 1982 ‚problematizations‛ following Canguilhem’s similar usage in 
1943 and then Deleuze’s reuse in 1968.28  Like their earlier archeological counterparts 
these genealogical problematizations function as conditions of possibility.  But there 
is no question of their being universal and necessary.  They are historical through 
and through.  It follows that they cannot properly be grasped in terms of the concept 
of transcendentality, at least not as that concept was conceived by Kant.  Genealogy 
is thus best seen not as a transcendental analytic but as what Paul Rabinow and 
Hubert Dreyfus usefully labeled, so long as one does not hear any residue of 
hermeneutics in the label, an ‚interpretive analytic.‛29 
 
From a philosophical perspective, we get a better version of Foucault for the 
purposes of critical historiography when we focus on Foucault’s later histories of 
problematization (which invoke both genealogy and archaeology in complementary 
fashion) rather than on a limited subset of his earlier archaeological histories 
(namely those two books from the mid-1960s that narrowly invoked only 
archaeology).  Regarding the archaeological and genealogical periods as deploying 
two historiographical analytics of varying breadth in the way I have suggested helps 
make vivid the philosophical defects in the narrowed conception of archaeology 
which Foucault himself came to recognize.  For it helps us see that archaeology as an 
analytic fails to bring historical change into view.  Many of Foucault’s early critics 
were skeptical on precisely this point.  To them archaeology did not seem to counte-
nance basic historical categories like development, evolution, continuity, and (hear 
now the gasps) progress.  Sartre noted this best: ‚Certainly Foucault’s perspective 
remains historical. He distinguishes different periods, a before and an after.  But he 
replaces the cinema with the magic lantern, movement by a succession of 
immobilities.‛30  The archaeologist first describes conditions that constrain one pe-
                                                 
28 See Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (NY: 
Zone Books, 1966, 1991), Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1968, 1994), Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, translated by Mark 
Lester (NY: Columbia University Press, 1969, 1990), and Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the 
Pathological, translated by Carolyn R. Fawcett (NY: Zone Books, 1943, 1991), 35. (Cf. Georges 
Canguilhem, ‚L’Objet de l’histoire des sciences,‛  in A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from 
Georges Canguilhem, edited by François Delaporte, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (NY: Zone 
Books, 1968, 1994), 30). 
29 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
second edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 1983), 122 ff.. 
30 Jean-Paul Sartre, ‚Jean-Paul Sartre répond.‛  L’Arc, 30 (1966): 87. 
 
Foucault Studies, No. 8, pp. 100-121 
 114 
riod of thought; they next describe the quite different conditions constraining 
another period of thought; finally, they infer historical difference on the basis of an 
underlying incommensurability between the two sets of conditions.  This procedure 
indeed demonstrates difference but it does not explicate difference historically.  
Archaeology only offers up incommensurable historical conditions and an 
inexplicable gap between them.  This is history in that it concerns the past but it is 
not historical history in that it does not engage change, mobility, and transition.  But 
what of those gaps so famously caught by archaeology?  What of the period of 
transition from one historical period to another?  Do limiting conditions inexplicably 
dip in and out of the historical field of experience?  If so, then we are left with an 
unexplained assumption that conditions of possibility are at one moment present in 
experience and in the next moment absent.  But do the fleeting periods of transition, 
however confused they may be, possess a historical a priori?  If not, then it follows 
that there are historical periods which an archaeological analytic cannot engage.  If 
so, then it follows that the historian needs another analytic in addition to (or perhaps 
instead of) archaeology in order to wield a more complete historiographical toolkit.  
This is precisely the analytical role that genealogy would come to play in Foucault’s 
better-developed historiography. 
 
To do whatever it was that he had set out to do, Foucault realized that he needed to 
change his tack from what he had adopted in the high-period archaeological works.  
This suggests that perhaps Foucault had never set out to develop a form of 
historical-transcendental inquiry.  If his work in a brief period in the mid-sixties 
resembled historical-transcendental phenomenology or invoked quasi-transcenden-
tal categories, Foucault would come to reject precisely those features that made it 
recognizable as such.  Foucault may have stumbled his way for a time into some-
thing resembling historical-transcendental inquiry, but once he recognized that he 
was there he headed elsewhere almost immediately, indeed even before The 
Archaeology of Knowledge was finished.  Only a few years later Foucault had already 
gained quite a distance from such a view: ‚Thus for me episteme has nothing to do 
with the Kantian categories< I strive instead to avoid any reference to this trans-
cendental as a condition of the possibility for any knowledge.‛31  To search Fou-
cault’s works for a solution to the well-known puzzles of critical-transcendental 
Kantianism or of historical-transcendental Husserliana is not only to search his 
works for something which he never sought to put there, but it is also to search them 
for something that is itself riddled with philosophical difficulties according to 
Foucault’s own matured philosophical sensibilities. 
 
In sum, Foucault’s philosophical-historical practice should not be read in terms of 
the Kantian category of transcendentality, even in those of its phenomenological 
                                                 
31 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 97-98. 
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inflections that seem to invest it with an appreciation for historicity.  In the previous 
section I showed that such a reading does not square with Foucault’s own 
statements about phenomenology and transcendentality.  In the present section I 
showed how a reading of Foucault along these lines generates philosophical 
perplexities which Foucault himself seemed to be wary of. 
 
Foucault’s work possesses enormous facility and range for philosophers and 
historians alike.  If we want a viable historiography and philosophy, why not take 
advantage of what is clearly featured in Foucault’s work rather than imposing on it 
certain demands that are only obscurely available within that work?  Why not free 
up that work so that we can more effectively do what Foucault set out to do?  Why 
not take up Foucault in light of Foucault’s problems and leave Husserl’s problems to 
Husserl (and Heidegger’s problems to Heidegger, and so on)? 
 
Critique in Foucault and in Kant 
It remains undeniable that Kant’s problems were of central concern for Foucault just 
as they were for Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger.  But were the Kantian problems that 
motivated Foucault the same Kantian problems that motivated these others?  Kant is 
a rich seam and one that Foucault and Husserl both mined.  My view is that they 
were digging there for quite different treasures.  Husserl chased Kant into the hills 
hoping for the gold of transcendentality.  Foucault patiently observed Kant excava-
ting humble nuggets of critical conditions of possibility and thereby learned to do 
the same himself. 
 
One way of understanding Foucault’s historiographical analytics (both archaeology 
and genealogy) is as an investigation of how historical conditions of possibility 
constrain thought and action in the present.  These conditions are not taken by Fou-
cault as universal and necessary, not even in the rather limited sense of universal 
across and necessary to a determinate domain or epoch of experience.  Conditions as 
bounds or limits—yes.  Conditions as necessary and universal limits across a domain 
of thought and action—no.  I said above that the core of Foucault’s historiography is 
an inquiry into the problematizations that condition our historical present.  
According to this interpretation, Foucaultian historiography is certainly a critical 
project insofar as it constitutes an inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of the 
present.  But it is not therefore a transcendental critique whose aim is to reveal 
universal and necessary conditions of possibility.32 
                                                 
32
 Foucault thus belongs in a different Kantian lineage than that traced by phenomenology.  I 
would claim, though I cannot defend it here, that two Kantian traditions of thought to which 
Foucault was much closer are critical theory and pragmatism.  As to the former, I refer the reader 
once again to Amy Allen The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary 
Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).  As to the latter, I argue for a basic 
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This interpretation implies a crucial distinction between critical conditions-of-
possibility (or limits or bounds) on the one hand and transcendental conditions-of-
possibility (or limits or bounds) on the other.  Transcendental conditions are a subset 
of critical conditions—they can be distinguished from other forms of critical condi-
tions by their modality (necessity), scope (universality), and appropriate cognitive 
object (aprioricity).  Where conditions of possibility are not explicated as universal 
and necessary conditions of aprioricity, there we find critique proceeding in a vein 
that is not transcendental in its construction. 
 
This distinction between critique and transcendental critique is, fortunately, not my 
own invention.33  It also seems to have figured in Kant’s work, albeit not with utmost 
clarity.  It is notable that much of Kant’s historical and anthropological writings 
make sense only on the assumption that there are viable forms of critique that are 
not transcendental in orientation.  Even more to the point is that there is nowhere in 
Kant’s writings where it is made clear that he thought that critique must always be 
transcendental in orientation even if it is abundantly clear that he was himself 
mostly interested in transcendental critique in the context of his epistemological 
                                                                                                                                                 
compatibility, and potential mutual enrichment, between genealogy and pragmatism in the final 
chapter of Koopman, Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).  I am also guest-editing a forthcoming special issue 
of Foucault Studies that will address in further detail the potentialities of a dialogue between 
Foucault’s work and various strands of pragmatism. 
33 Some such distinction is needed within the context of Kant’s philosophy in order for his later 
more anthropological writings to have a place within his critical system, which he insisted they 
did as shown by Holly Wilson, Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, And Critical 
Significance (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006). My interpretation of Kant 
also accords with that offered by a young Foucault in Michel Foucault, ‚Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology,‛ translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008). 
Also available online as Foucault, ‚Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from a pragmatic point 
of view‛, translated by Arianna Bove, at <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault1.htm>, 
Feb., 2008. It also possesses the distinctive advantage of being in line with that of well-regarded 
Kant scholars ranging from Tom Rockmore, Kant and Idealism, (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2007) to P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen Publishing Ltd., 1966),  
(Concerning the latter it is worth mentioning that I was told by Foucault scholar Arnold 
Davidson that there is evidence that Foucault read Strawson, among other analytic philosophers, 
with great interest during his time in Tunisia in the late sixties.)  Finally, my reading happily sits 
well with Habermas’s recent reinterpretation of a detranscendentalized critical Kantianism as 
developed in Habermas, Truth and Justification. Translated by Barbara Fultner (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, 1999, 2003) and recently discussed by Amy Allen, ‚‘Having One’s Cake and Eating It Too’: 
Habermas’s Genealogy of Post-Secular Reason.‛ Ms. on file with the author. Forthcoming.  An 
interpretation of Foucault as deploying detranscendentalized Kantian critique takes us a long 
way toward a reconciliation between Foucaultian and Habermasian strains in critical theory and 
this, to my mind, ought to be welcomed by critical theorists of both stripes. 
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inquiry into the conditions of possibility of synthetic judgment a priori.  More im-
portant for present purposes is the fact that a distinction between critique and 
transcendental critique was also central for Foucault as elaborated in an essay which 
takes Kant as its starting and ending points: ‚criticism is not transcendental, and its 
goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and 
archaeological in its method.‛34  I leave it an open question whether or not my 
distinction fits the third party to my argument, namely the phenomenologists—I will 
somewhat hesitatingly assert that the distinction I am urging is not as clearly per-
ceived in that tradition as we may wish and that in any event the phenomenologists 
do not distinguish critique and transcendentality with nearly as much clarity as we 
find in Foucault.35 
 
Employing this distinction between the genus of critique and transcendental critique 
as one species therein enables a view about how Foucault’s project is Kantian 
without being Kantian all the way down.  Foucault’s project is Kantian in its 
emphasis on critique without being uncritically Kantian in accepting Kant’s own 
conception of what a critique ought to be.  Foucault was a Kantian in that his work, 
in Amy Allen’s apt description, ‚constitutes a critique of critique itself, a conti-
                                                 
34 Foucault, ‚What is Enlightenment,‛ 315. 
35 Husserl, for example, appears to have been largely uninterested in the possibility of non-
transcendental critique (that is, critique into conditions not universal and necessary).  In the Crisis 
he explicitly champions the transcendental in terms of its capacities as a ‚universal philosophy‛ 
1937, §16, §26) inaugurated by Descartes and then reinvented by Kant, though I confess that I 
find Husserl’s attempted ‚definition‛ of ‚transcendental philosophy‛ (§27) out of keeping with 
my usual understanding of that word. (See Edmund Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, translated by David 
Carr (Chicago: Northwestern University, 1937, 1970). Going forward from Husserl one can 
discern in the career of phenomenology a gradual softening of the attachment to a strong 
conception of transcendentality in, say, Heidegger, then Merleau-Ponty, and finally Derrida.  
Foucault should not be situated at the end of such a sequence.  His project has little to do with 
Derrida’s just as it has little do with Husserl’s.  A better endpoint for that sequence, if I had to 
suggest one, would be the work of Giorgio Agamben who wrote in his Infancy and History: The 
Destruction of Experience, translated by Liz Heron (NY: Verso, 1978, 2007) of ‚a transcendental 
history, which in a sense constitutes the a priori limit and structure of all historical knowledge.‛ 
(Agamben, 57) From this suggestion it follows that I do not find Agamben a helpful guide to 
Foucault, an implication I happily endorse though I cannot defend it here except to say that 
Agamben is profoundly un-Foucauldian in method. (I would like to thank Christoph Durt for 
helpful conversations about Husserl during my time at the University of California, Santa Cruz 
and Elena Cuffari and Christy Reynolds at the University of Oregon for a few intensive 
discussions of Agamben’s work.) 
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nuation-through-transformation of that project.‛36  Foucault allowed himself to ex-
periment with practices of critique other than transcendental critique. 
 
My point is not that Kant was wrong to undertake transcendental critique and 
Foucault right to undertake historical critique.  My claim is rather that Kant and 
Foucault undertook two very different kinds of critique of two very different kinds 
of objects of inquiry.  Kant was right to insist that synthetic a priori judgments 
would require a transcendental critique.  But this leaves open the possibility that 
Foucault may have been right to suggest that the quarry of his inquiries might be 
conditioned by limits which are not transcendental at all but rather historical and yet 
no less constraining for that reason.  Foucault thus appropriated from Kant the idea 
of critique and its attendant conceptual apparatus of limiting conditions of 
possibility.  Kant at least in his more transcendental moods insisted that we could 
specify in advance how these conditions are constituted, namely by the means of a 
cognitive apparatus as described by a faculty psychology that many have since 
abandoned.37  Foucault left it an open question how conditions of possibility get con-
stituted.  There is no need to see Foucault as departing altogether from Kant in this 
respect.  He simply labored in different fields, toiling with other plows, and perhaps 
in doing so carrying on an important aspect of the Kantian legacy to reap a harvest 
that Kant himself never dreamt of. 
 
I am suggesting that we see Foucault as having worked with the following question: 
May the determinants of our thought and action be limited by nothing greater than 
contingency, nothing more profound than historical luck, nothing but unholy chance 
itself?  In considering this question it pays to remember that Foucault is in good 
company in asking it: Hume, Darwin, Nietzsche and, more recently, Bernard 
Williams and Ian Hacking, have all taken the idea of contingency quite seriously in 
their profound searches for constraining historical conditions.  But does this mean 
that Foucault is just a straightforward classical empiricist in a Humean mold?  Not 
quite.  
                                                 
36 Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, 24; on the importance of Kant for Foucault see also Ian Hacking, 
‚Self-Improvement‛ in David Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader (New York, Blackwell, 1984) 
and, in a somewhat different vein, Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique, and Djaballah, Kant, 
Foucault, and Forms of Experience.  
37 The psychological overtones of constructivism in Kant were severely rebuked by Strawson, The 
Bounds of Sense, whose major contribution was to show that Kant’s critique of the bounds of 
experience did not require that version of faculty psychology on which Kant seems to have based 
it.  Many commentators since, including Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of 
Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Tom Rockmore, 
Kant and Idealism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007) have emphasized the importance 
of reinterpreting constructivism as a variable cultural rather than invariable psychological 
process.  This places Kant more in line with Foucault. 
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Foucault, like some of those others on my list, is better thought of as something like 
a Kantian critical empiricist.  Foucault’s work was an inquiry into conditions of 
possibility.  This is itself already well beyond the minimal (some would say naïve) 
empiricism that inquires into conditions of actuality, that is, merely causal 
conditions or mere conditions of connection.  Behind whatever it is that makes the 
stuff of our practices actual, there are background conditions that make these very 
actualities possible.  Sometimes we may want to know why a prison was built, by 
whom, for what purposes, and with what rationale.  Other times we may want to 
know how it came to be that it ever became possible to build such a thing as a 
prison.  The classical empiricist asks ‛why this prison?‛ whilst the critical empiricist 
asks ‛how this prison?‛— two very different, yet not incompatible, questions. 
 
A central point of Foucault’s histories of problematization, in nearly all of their 
diverse forms, was to show that the conditions which limit the present are 
contingently formed by extraordinarily complex historical processes.  While this was 
probably a central point in his high-archaeology phase too, we ought to admit that 
Foucault in these years never quite found the right way of putting the point.  It took 
the expansionist move of adding genealogy to archaeology to get things right.  On 
the more developed view, not only do genealogy and archaeology together show us 
that the limits of the present are contingent constraints of complex composition, but 
they also provide us with the specific materials that form these constraints.  As such, 
they provide the materials we would need to experimentally transform the limits of 
our present.  Foucaultian histories of problematizations do not merely show us that 
the present is contingently formed – they also show us how the present has been 
contingently formed.  This difference between the factual that of contingency and an 
inquiry into how things are contingently composed is in my view absolutely crucial 
for a proper understanding of Foucault’s critical project.  For if this project explicates 
the how and not just the that of contingency, then one of the richest yields of 
Foucaultian history is that it offers a clarification of the tools we would need to 
(re)constitute and yet of course (re)constrain ourselves in the present.38 
 
Critical Historian as Critical Philosopher 
In order to produce the specific materials needed to experimentally test the limits of 
ourselves, Foucault engaged in patient historical research.  Many philosophers have 
had concerns about the historical erudition featured in Foucault’s work even if they 
are also clearly attracted to it.  For example, Han-Pile denies the claims of Gary 
Gutting and others that Foucault is ‚a historian in the empirical sense‛ because she 
                                                 
38 This distinction between the fact that some practice is contingent and the history of how some 
practice is contingent is yet one more point I further develop in Koopman (forthcoming); I 
apologize for all the promissory notes issued in this article. 
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reads this as implying that Foucault is a mere empiricist.39  When Gutting asserts that 
‚Foucault is concerned with forging a new approach to historical analysis,‛ she 
interprets this as asserting that Foucault was merely a historian.40  The thought is that 
if Foucault is not something of a phenomenologist whose work is informed by 
something of the historical-transcendental, then it is not clear that he offers us 
anything more than just one more way of writing history, just one more way of 
doing social science, just one more method for merely empirical description.  But this 
familiar complaint misses the crucial difference between classical (or naïve) 
empiricism and critical empiricism (or, even better, between Humean empiricism 
and that combination of Humean empiricism and Kantian critique which I detect in 
Foucault).  Foucault always insisted that we must combine history in a straight-
forward empirical sense with a critical inquiry that asks deeper historico-theoretical 
and historico-political questions.  This is just one way in which his work undermines 
our cozy disciplinary distinctions, such as that between a supposedly empirically 
pure history and a supposedly theoretically pure philosophy.  Consider, as just one 
example of this almost constant theme in Foucault’s work, the three registers on 
which Foucault situates his critique of the repressive hypothesis in the first volume 
of The History of Sexuality: Foucault refers to ‚properly historical,‛ ‚historico-
theoretical,‛ and ‚historic-political‛ doubts.  The crucial point is that Foucault simul-
taneously works on all three registers and once.  It is from this simultaneous em-
ployment of the empirical and the critical that his work derives its particular 
strength and provocation.  One undervalued and neglected facet of the way in which 
Foucault’s work thus functioned concerns the specifically empirical or ‚properly 
historical‛ quality of much of his research.  It is unquestionable that for Foucault 
empirical history played a unique function as part of a broader project of critical 
inquiry.  We can learn much from his example. 
 
We philosophers often pride ourselves on rising above the merely historical, the 
merely empirical, or the merely social scientific.  But why should we think that that all 
social scientific inquiry is deserving of that derisive and disarming epithet, ‛mere‛?  
Why should philosophy have to rise above the empirical into the transcendental in 
order to be capable of what we expect from it?  When philosophers begin to more 
fully appreciate the philosophical rigor that informs the most sophisticated inquiries 
in the social sciences, then we might just learn to stop being anxious when one of our 
guild sneaks past the disciplinary watchtowers and starts laboring in those other 
fields where philosophical thought and empirical inquiry are integral to one another.  
This is precisely what Foucault did (though it remains an open question to what 
extent the gatekeepers were policing disciplinary borders in French academia in the 
fifties and sixties).  When we come to understand that Foucault was no less a philo-
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sopher for being a philosopher-historian, then we might just begin taking his project 
seriously in the very terms in which he proposed it.  When that happens, then we 
might begin to understand why Foucault understood his own work as a critical 
inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of the present and yet at the same time 
as an inquiry that was not transcendental in orientation.  It is in this sense that 
Foucault deserves to be taken seriously as a philosopher and as a historian precisely 
because of his refusal of the category of transcendentality.41 
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